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Case Comments
Avoiding Collateral Estoppel Through Proof of Jury
Compromise: Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co.
In 1975, eighteen-year-old Benna H. Katz was diagnosed as
having adenocarcinoma of the vagina, allegedly caused by her
mother's ingestion of DES while pregnant. Katz brought a diversity action in the Eastern District of New York against Eli
Lilly & Co. (Lilly), a manufacturer of Diethystilbestrol (DES),
requesting five million dollars in damages for negligence and
breach of warranty in the testing and distribution of DES.
Upon Katz's death from cancer in 1977, her mother ified suit on
the same grounds.' During the pendency of the Katz litigation,
a New York Supreme Court jury returned a $500,000 verdict
against Eli Lilly in a similar case, Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.2
Lilly's counsel maintained that this verdict was reached by
compromise, 3 because one of the jurors 4 allegedly indicated
1. Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
2. No. 15600/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., July 16, 1979), discussed in 84
F.R.D. at 379.
3. A compromise verdict represents a surrender by some jurors of conscientious convictions on one material issue in return for relinquishment by
others of settled opinion on another issue. Bourdreau v. Damas Food Mkt.
Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 913, 914, 268 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842, rev'd on other grounds, 52 Misc.
2d 930, 227 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1966). In its most common form, the compromise will
be between damages and liability, with some jurors trading a reduced damage
award for their settled belief as to the defendant's nonculpability. See Carrousseaux v. City of New York, 127 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (1954) ('To consider the verdict
a compromise ...requires a finding that the jury was not liable or was dubious
about its liability, but, emotionally swayed by the nature and extent of the injuries and special damages, rendered its verdict."). Compromise verdicts are
condemned on grounds of fear that such verdicts may be based on factors such
as a desire to end deliberations quickly or sympathy for the defendant, rather
than the weight of evidence.
4. The judge in Bichler instructed the jurors at the end of the trial:
It's entirely up to you whether you wish to discuss the deliberations
with anybody at all. You are not obligated to. If you do not wish to,
please don't hesitate to refrain from saying anything. However, on the
other hand, if it is your desire to talk about the case to anyone, you are
free to do so, as well.
/
Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. at 379. After complaints by a Bichler juror of
harassment, however, the Bichler judge prohibited all contact between Lilly's
counsel and the jurors during the pendency of the Katz court's ruling on the
depositions of jurors that Lilly proposed to take. Id. at 380. For discussion of
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that she had agreed to concur on liability for Lilly on the condition that damages would be determined by averaging the
amount each juror recommended. 5 In an attempt to foreclose
the possibility that the Bichler verdict might be given collateral
estoppel effect in subsequent DES litigation, 6 Lilly's counsel
sought an affidavit from the juror that restated the substance of

the jury compromise. The juror refused to cooperate, 7 however,
and Lilly responded by seeking discovery subpoenas for juror
depositions, arguing that, although testimony of jurors could
not be used to impeach a verdict under New York law, 8 the testimony might be used to demonstrate that the verdict was
tainted to the extent that it should not be given collateral estoppel effect.9 The district court denied the plaintiff's motion to
vacate the deposition notices and quash the subpoenas,O holdpost-trial contacts between attorneys and jurors, see notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text.
5. 84 F.R.D. at 380.
6. Lilly's estimated aggregate liability exposure was several billion dollars, 84 F.R.D. at 380, and the Katz opinion refers to a case commenced one
week after the Bichler verdict was publicized specifically urging that the
Bichler judgment be given estoppel effect on the issue of liability. Id. at 380
n.1. Other reported decisions involving Eli Lilly as defendant include Ryan v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979) (denying class certification to all female residents of South Carolina whose mothers had used DES during their
pregnancies); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (a
class action involving some 1,000 women); Grey v. United States, 445 F. Supp.
337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (dismissing action on grounds that plaintiff was "unable to identify Lilly as the particular manufacturer of DES taken by her
mother"); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 CaL
Rptr. 122 (woman unable to identify particular brand of DES injested by her
mother could recover if defendants produced a "substantial percentage" of
drug in industry), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980). For general background on
DES litigation, see Henderson, DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches
Shore, 3 CORP. L. REV. 143 (1980); Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes ProductsLiability Field, 66 A.BAJ. 827 (July 1980) (estimating that over 1000 actions are
pending against the various manufacturers of DES).
7. 84 F.R.D. at 380. These discussions also led Lilly to the conclusion that
a second juror had "information relevant to the question of jury compromise,
which a subsequent interview. . . confirmed." Id. There is no indication in the
record whether this second juror was willing to cooperate with Lilly or to excute an affidavit; the juror was, however, served with a discovery subpoena.
8. The Katz court purported to apply New York law on witness competence under Federal Rule of Evidence 601, which applies state rules on competence in diversity cases. 84 F.R.D. at 381 n.5. See note 50 infra.
9. 84 F.R.D. at 380. In a letter to the trial judge in the Katz litigation,
dated October 30, 1979, counsel for Eli Lilly argued that:
Denying plaintiff's motion and allowing Lilly to depose the two jurors
would be fundamentally fair to Lilly and at the same time would do no
disservice to the jury system. Lilly is not mounting a major assault on
the citadel of jury sanctity. In fact, its efforts would not even constitute
a minor skirmish. The company merely seeks to avoid being forever
haunted by a jury verdict which was unfairly derived.
10. The motion was made pursuant to Rules 26 (governing the scope of dis-
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ing that "where through permissible investigation apart from
the compulsion of any court order a party demonstrates a factual basis for a belief that a judgment asserted against it as collateral estoppel was based on a compromise verdict, further
inquiry into the facts by depositions of jurors shown to have information relevant to the issues is warranted under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."" Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D.
378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
The principle that jurors are incompetent to testify as to
the nature of their verdicts was first expressed in 1785 when
Lord Mansfield refused to consider the affidavit of a juror which
stated that the verdict had been reached "by lot." Lord Mansfield concluded that "a witness shall not be heard to allege his
own moral turpitude."' 2 This decision has been widely followed, but the theoretical basis for exclusion of juror testimony
is poorly defined; as Learned Hand observed, "the whole subject has been obscured, apparently beyond hope of clarification,
by Lord Mansfield's oft quoted language."13 Courts that refuse
to admit juror testimony on the compromise nature of a verdict
have adopted a number of rationales, perhaps best represented
by the United States Supreme Court's language in McDonald v.
Pless:14
But let it once be established that a verdict solemnly made and publicly returned can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those
vho took part in the publication and all verdicts could be, and many
would be followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something
which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harrassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of
facts which might establish misconduct. ...
If evidence thus secured
could be thus used the result would be to make what was intended to
be a private deliberation the subject of constant public investigation; to
the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and confer15
ence.
covery generally and providing for the issuance of protective orders) and 45
(governing the issuance of a discovery subpoena) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 84 F.R.D. at 380.
11. 84 F.R.D. at 382.
12. Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). Apparently considering
this principle to be of general application, Lord Mansfield did not restrict it to
exclusion of juror testimony. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
13. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947).
14. 238 U.S. 264 (1915) (alleged quotient verdict). Use of juror affidavits to
establish compromise had earlier been prohibited in the federal courts by Hyde
v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 (1911).
15. 238 U.S. at 267-68. See also Government of Virgin Island v. Gereau, 523
F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976) (the court stated
that the rule against jurors impeaching their verdicts "was formulated to foster
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The rule against the receipt of such testimony is not absolute;16 courts have developed numerous exceptions. No court
prior to Katz, however, had examined the legal doctrine prohibiting the testimony of jurors in the context of the evolving doctrine of collateral estoppel. The dilemma confronted by the
trial court in Katz illustrates the difficulties that courts confront in formulating workable standards for the application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Recent expansions of the
doctrine to allow the "offensive" use of a prior verdict by a nonparty litigant as a means of establishing liability17 introduces
complications found in neither the old "mutuality" rule18 nor
the later expansion of collateral estoppel to allow "defensive"
several public policies: (1) discouraging harassment of jurors by losing parties
... ; (2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors; (3) reducing incentives for jury tampering; (4) promoting verdict finality; (5) maintaining the
viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body."). See generally Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under
Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REv. 920 (1978); Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53
MARQ. L. REV. 258 (1979); Note, To Impeach or Not to Impeach. The Stability of
JurorVerdicts in Federal Courts, 4 PEPPERDiNE I- REV. 343 (1977).
16. See note 41 infra.
17. Explicit authorization of the use of collateral estoppel as a method of
establishing liability was not forthcoming in any American jurisdiction until
1967 when, in B.R. DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967), the Court of Appeals of New York held that a party found negligent after a full trial would not be allowed to deny his liability as against a second
plaintiff bringing an action on the same accident. Offensive use of collateral estoppel was recently found constitutional in Parkane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979) (upholding the use of an "equitable" SEC proceeding as estoppel in subsequent civil litigation against a seventh amendment constitutional
challenge based on the lack of right to a jury trial in the prior proceeding). See
generally Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praiseit: An Analysis of
CollateralEstoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS L. REV.
755 (1980); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALus. L. REV. 25
(1965); Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 281 (1957); Polasky, CollateralEstoppel--Effects of Prior Litigation, 39
IOWA L. REV. 217 (1954); Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of
Parties, 68 COLum. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Of.
fensive Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1010 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Impacts]; Note, Non-Mutuality: Taking the
Fairnessout of CollateralEstoppel, 13 IND. I R.v.563 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Non-Mutuality].
18. Under the mutuality doctrine, a prior judgment could not be given collateral estoppel effect unless both parties to the subsequent suit would be
bound by the prior judgment. See, e.g., Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
Co., 225 U.S. 111, 115 (1912); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). The mutuality rule was universally applied in both federal and state courts until Justice
Traynor's decision in Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942). See note 19 infra. In 1967, a New York Court of Appeals pronounced
the doctrine of mutuality a "dead letter". B.R. Dewitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147,
225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967).
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use by a subsequent non-party litigant. 19
In New York, as elsewhere, a judgment will have collateral
estoppel effect if the party against whom it is asserted had a
"full and fair opportunity" to litigate the previous action. 20 Although this standard is theoretically the same for both offensive and defensive use, 21 cases of offensive collateral estoppel

raise more pressing questions about whether the prior suit
presented the required "opportunity." Because the party
against whom estoppel is urged in offensive-use cases will most
frequently be the defendant in both the present and prior action, that party has not had the opportunity to choose the forum or the timing of the prior action.22 Additionally, plaintiffs
19. Defensive use of collateral estoppel involves the use of a prior judgment as a defense against alleged liability by a subsequent defendant who does
not meet the requirements of the mutuality doctrine. Defensive collateral estoppel was first allowed in Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122
P.2d 892, 895 (1942). Defensive use of collateral estoppel in cases involving federal causes of action was affirmed in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). A bare majority of
jurisdictions have now abandoned the mutuality rule and allow defensive use
of collateral estoppeL See Callen & Kadue, supra note 17, at 757; Non-Mutuality, supra note 17, at 566-67.
20. Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728,
298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 959 (1969) ("Although we have not previously said so, it is now
evident that New York has adopted the full and fair opportunity test in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel."). See also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971). See generally
Polasky, supra note 17, at 250. Examples of instances in which the prior litigation did not provide a full and fair opportunity include those in which the prior
suit involved only nominal damages and the subsequent litigation was not foreseeable, and in which the prior suit was brought in a forum providing only limited procedural opportunities, such as a court of limited jurisdiction. See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).
21. See Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 70-71, 246 N.E.2d
725, 728-29, 958 N.Y.S.2d 955, 959-60 (1969). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1976). Although none of the states
adopting the full and fair opportunity test have expressly adopted different
standards and use of collateral estoppel, some cases treat offensive and defensive use situations differently. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 349 U.S. 322,
329 (1978) ("[I]n both the offensive and defensive use situations, the party
against whom estoppel is asserted has litigated and lost in an earlier action.
Nevertheless, several reasons have been advanced why the two situations
should be treated differently.").
A number of jurisdictions have allowed defensive use of collateral estoppel
while specifically prohibiting offensive use. See, e.g., Standage Ventures, Inc. v.
State, 114 Ariz. 480, 484, 562 P.2d 360, 364 (1977); Goolsby v. Derby, 189 N.W.2d
909, 916 (Iowa 1971); Home Owners Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 455, 238 N.E.2d 55, 58-59 (1968). The
trend, however, is against such a defensive use limitation. See Non-Mutuality,
supra note 17, at 568-69. See also R. E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 94 Cal.
App. 3d 419, 156 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980) (rejecting
the defensive use limitation in California).
22. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979). In defen-
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who desire to use collateral estoppel offensively will not be inclined to join their separate causes of action into a single suit.
Plaintiffs may develop a "wait and see" attitude and litigate
separately, in the hope that a favorable prior verdict will relieve
them of the burdens of litigation through the operation of the
doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. 23 As a practical matter, therefore, courts are generally more sympathetic to claims

of "unfairness" in situations involving offensive use of collateral estoppel, and in such cases give greater scrutiny to the
prior judgment. Recognizing this, the United States Supreme
Court recently adopted a flexible standard for the application of
offensive collateral estoppel in cases involving federal causes of
action:
[Tlhe preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is...
to grant the trial courts broad discretion to determine
when [the offensive use of collateral estoppel] should be applied.
[When] the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral es24
toppel.

To sanction the use of offensive collateral estoppel when
the asserted verdict is a product of jury compromise (rather
than being based on the weight of the evidence) is indeed unfair to the defendant. 25 Courts that have considered the issue
sive use cases, the prior judgment is most frequently asserted against the party
who was plaintiff in the l5rior action. In such a situation
there would appear to be no reason to assume that he did not have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate. Thus, there is no reason to assume
that he lacked sufficient motive to litigate when it was he himself who
commenced the litigation. Similarly, it would be anomalous to consider
the fairness of his forum when it was he himself who chose the forum.
In short, a party who instigated the prior suit is in a poor position to
complain about the adequacy of his opportunity to litigate in that suit.
James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, LTD, 444 F.2d 451, 462 (5th Cir. 1971)
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
23. Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against
a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant
wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude
.... [Plotential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to
lose by not intervening in the first action.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). This result arises from
constitutional due process limitations which prohibit the application of collateral estoppel against a party who has not previously litigated a matter. See
note 60 infra and accompanying text. By contrast, in defensive use cases, the
plaintiff in the prior action will usually have had the opportunity to join all relevant claimants in a single action. Granting the resultant judgment collateral estoppel effect therefore discourages the use of multiple suits in the hopes of
escaping an adverse verdict by "trying again" against another opponent. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979). See generally Impacts,
supra note 17, at 1024-26.
24. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
25. See note 3 supra. There are no cases considering the effect of jury
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have therefore shown a willingness to hold that jury compromise provides a basis for denying offensive collateral estoppel
effect to a prior judgment.26 A verdict that granted less than
the plaintiff's proven special damages, 27 a verdict that granted
a minimal award in comparison with the quantum of the defendant's fault as assessed by the jury,28 and a verdict that
demonstrated that the jury was influenced by sympathy for the

prior litigant 29 are all instances in which collateral estoppel efcompromise on defensive use of collateral estoppel. Because there is no theoretical difference between the standard to be applied in offensive and defensive
use cases, it is quite possible that such a case might arise. Defensive use of
collateral estoppel, however, provides an incentive for the plaintiff to join all
defendants in one action; courts may therefore be reluctant to allow a losing
prior plaintiff a second chance against a party that could have been joined in
the prior action asserted as estoppel even if indications of jury compromise are
evident. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
26. In holding that compromise is a valid grounds for denying collateral estoppel effect, courts have carved an exception out of the common law rule that
estoppel 'Isby judgment, not by verdict." 1B J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
0.443[4], at 3917 (2d ed. 1980). Broadly stated, a valid and unimpeached judgment will not be denied collateral estoppel effect because of irregularities in
the underlying verdict; such an erroneous verdict must ordinarily be attacked
on appeal, if at all. Denying a judgment collateral estoppel effect because a litigant lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate is normally consistent with
this doctrine, as most of the factors taken into account are extrinsic to the verdict in the prior action. For example, to contend that a party had inadequate
incentive to litigate and hence should not be bound in subsequent litigation
does not require an assumption that the prior verdict was in any way irregular.
By contrast, a denial of collateral estoppel effect based on jury compromise in
the prior action is based on a conviction that "unfairness" must be prevented
because of a belief that the verdict underlying the judgment is flawed. The trial
judge in Katz recognized the common law position on estoppel by judgment,
but concluded that, no matter what its merits may be in inter partes litigation,
application in situations involving offensive use of collateral estoppel "violates
basic notions of fairness." 84 F.R.D. at 382.
27. See Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 306 P.2d 797 (1957). This California case is perhaps unique in that Justice Traynor, observing that the prior
verdict was for an amount less than plaintiff's proven special damages, and
therefore inferring the existence as compromise, explicitly held that such a
compromise verdict was not entitled to collateral estoppel effect. Traynor
rested the decision on the theory that the compromise meant that the issues of
liability had not actually been decided, id. at 896, 306 P.2d at 799, a rationale
that did not find favor with contemporary commentators. See lB J. MOORE
FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.443[4], at 3917 (2d ed. 1980); Comment, 56 MIn. L REV.
117, 118 (1957). But see Non-Mutuality, supra note 17, at 578 ("typical of the
heavy weight usually accorded compromise verdicts").
28. See Breener v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966) (argument on appeal of airline
crash case in which liability was limited by Warsaw Pact, to apply judgment of
collateral case in which $35,000 of a $150,000 request was awarded, was rejected
because lack of evidence of "wilfull misconduct" and limited size of verdict in
the collateral case pointed to compromise).
29. See Lundeen v. Hackbarth, 285 Minn. 7, 171 N.W.2d 87 (1969) (in denying collateral estoppel effect to prior judgment against defendant in an automo-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:983

fect has been denied the prior judgment. New York has recognized that "indications of a compromise verdict" are among a
list of factors that "make up the realities of litigation,"30 and
should therefore be taken into account in determining whether
to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior judgment in offensive-use situations. 31 Other jurisdictions have expressed a concern that application of offensive collateral estoppel should not
"work an injustice" 32-- a standard that would seem to allow
room for consideration of jury compromise.
Although indications of compromise insufficient to require
bile accident case in which the only issue was the color of a traffic light, the
court discussed at length factors that may have led jurors to feel sympathy for
the successful litigant in the prior case).
30. Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728,
298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969) (dicta). Cf. Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("a verdict apparently influenced by sympathy
for the parties charged should not be given conclusive effect in subsequent litigation").
31. Other jurisdictions, including California, Oregon and Maine have
adopted this approach. See Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal.2d 893, 896, 306 P.2d 797,
799 (1957); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 769 (Me. 1979); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 108, 550 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1976)
(dicta).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976)
explicitly finds compromise to be grounds for denying collateral estoppel effect
to a verdict, statingA party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing
party, in accordance with §§ 68 and 68.1, is also precluded from doing so
with another person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The
circumstances to which consideration should be given include those
enumerated in § 68.1 and also whether.
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among the parties to the first action that are not present in the
subsequent action, or was based on a compromise verdict or finding.
Comment (g) notes:
[W]here the issues have been tried to a jury, the circumstances may
suggest that the issue was resolved by compromise ....
In [this] and
similar situations, taking the prior determination at face value for purposes of the second action would extend the effects of imperfections in
the adjudicative process beyond the limits of the first adjudication,
within which they are accepted only because of the practical necessity
of achieving finality.
32. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1979); cf. Standefer
v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 and n.17 (1980) (possibility of compromise
one reason for denying collateral estoppel effect to criminal aquittals). See also
Idaho State Univ. v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 731, 552 P.2d 776, 783 (1976); McCarty
v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 282 Minn. 497, 501-02, 165 N.W.2d 548, 551 (1969); Simpson
Timber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 576 P.2d 437, 441 (Wash. App. 1978). Minnesota has refused application of collateral estoppel on equitable grounds
under circumstances strongly suggesting that the court suspected the existence
of compromise. See note 29 supra.
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a new trial may nevertheless be sufficient for a subsequent
33
court to deny collateral estoppel effect to an earlier judgment,
the question of whether to deny becomes more complicated
when the only way to prove compromise is through juror testimony. The Katz court was faced with just such a situation: the
only indications of compromise in the Bichler jury deliberations were unverified statements made by a juror to Lilly. In
New York, as in a majority of jurisdictions, such testimony is
generally inadmissible. 34 In balancing the competing goals of
achieving an equitable result in the offensive use of collateral
estoppel and of protecting the integrity of the jury system, the
Katz court emphasized the need to afford Lilly "every reasonable opportunity to explore the factual basis for the claim that
the judgment asserted as binding on it should not be accorded
such an effect because it was based on a compromise verdict." 3
Noting that the testimony of the Bichler jurors could not be
permitted for the purposes of "impeaching or collaterally attacking the validity of the Bichler verdict as the verdict in that
case," 36 the court examined the "equitable nature" of collateral
estoppel and emphasized the "manifest" need for discovery by
the party seeking to defend against the offensive use of the doctrine.3 7 The court noted that the policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel require that a litigant be allowed "to
33. It is possible to postulate indications of compromise in addition to
those discussed in notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. For example, in
National Credit Corporation v. Ritchey, 254 Ark. 139, 491 S.W.2d 811 (1973) a defendant was unsuccessful in setting aside a verdict even though the blackboard
in the jury room contained each juror's assessment of the damages due the
plaintiff (including one juror who wrote "none"), and the figures were totalled
and divided by twelve to obtain the sum of the verdict. It was held that the
defendant failed to establish the necessary prior agreement to be bound. See
note 51 infra and accompanying text. Arguably, such evidence would be sufficient to avoid the collateral estoppel effect of such a verdict. Similarly, a verdict for an odd amount, including cents or fractions of cents, is insufficient to
set aside a verdict. See, e.g., Turner v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 S.C. 253,
264, 163 S.E. 796, 800 (1932) (award for $4,923.91); City of Pekin v. Winkel, 77 Ill.
56, 58 (1875) (award for $275.16 %). Yet such evidence raises a strong possibility that a quotient process was used, with at least a concommitant possibility of
compromise, and collateral estoppel should therefore be precluded.
34. In New York, the principle was firmly established in a number of early
cases, including People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 380-81, 111 N.E. 1077, 1080
(1916); Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N.Y. 361, 363 (1875); Williams v. Montgomery,
60 N.Y. 648 (1875). See generally notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
35. 84 F.R.D. at 381-82.
36. Id. at 380. The court recognized the common law position that it is the
judgment that gives rise to estoppel, not the verdict, but argued that this principle should not rule out the taking of juror testimony when a plaintiff seeks to
use a judgment offensively for collateral estoppel purposes. Id. at 382.
37. Id. at 381.
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explore the basis for a defense to offensive use of the judgment
as collateral estoppel against it."38 The court thus held that
when a party demonstrates a "colorable" 3 9 argument that the
prior judgment asserted against it was not reached by "a fair
and just determination of the facts," deposition of jurors shown
to have relevant information is permissible. 40
The Katz court's resolution of the threshold question of
whether state policies against the admission of juror testimony
on the nature of their verdicts should preclude receipt of such
evidence for the purpose of denying a judgment collateral estoppel effect is to be welcomed. The prohibition on the receipt
of such testimony has never been absolute,4 1 and courts have
freely created exceptions to the general rule when the need for
the receipt of such evidence has outweighed the policy reasons
for its exclusion. 42 Given the potential for offensive use of collateral estoppel to magnify the effects of an "unfair" verdict,
the rule against receipt of juror testimony should not be applied in such situations to exclude what may be the only available evidence of compromise.
38. 84 F.R.D. at 382. Because jurisdiction was based on diversity, the court
maintained that New York law on collateral estoppel controlled. Id. at 381 n.3
(citing Lowell v. Twin Disc, Inc., 527 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975)).
39. The court does not elaborate on what showing would be considered
sufficiently "colorable" to allow deposition of jurors.
40. 84 F.R.D. at 382.
41. Recognized exceptions in New York law include testimony to establish
that a juror lied on voir dire, In re Nunns, 176 N.Y.S. 858, 860 (1919), that a juror
concealed prejudice against a party, People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 257-58, 186
N.E. 693, 694 (1933), that the jurors were improperly influenced by third persons, such as court officials, Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), or that jurors made an unauthorized visit to the scene of a crime, People v. De Lucia, 20
N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, (1967). The exceptions for "extraneous prejudicial information" and improper "outside influence" embodied in
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) produce the same result in the federal system.
See generally Mueller, supra note 15, at 943-56.
42. In recognizing the exception for testimony as to juror's unauthorized
visits to the scene of a crime, the De Lucia court concluded that "public policy
considerations must at all times be weighed against the defendant's fundamental rights." Id. Commenting on earlier precedent, the court observed "[tihus,
where a patent injustice to a defendant was present, we distinguished the case
on a philosophical ground, although the prohibited result, the impeachment of
the verdict, remained. This was a recognition that the rule against jurors' impeachment of their verdicts should not operate in every case." Id. at 529. The
court concluded that the case was best viewed as an example of the "balancing" standard.
Similarly, when establishing the exclusionary principle for juror testimony
on quotient verdicts in the landmark case McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264
(1915), the Supreme Court recognized "that it would not be safe to lay down
any inflexible rule because there might be instances in which such testimony
of the juror could not be excluded without 'violating the plainest principles of
justice.'" Id. at 268-69.

1981]

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

By focusing its analysis on the permanence of verdicts as
the rationale for the exclusion of juror testimony, however, the
Katz court failed to consider the full scope of New York's policies on the subject, and, consequently, sanctioned the use of
mechanisms to gather evidence that unduly infringe on the integrity of the jury system. Although use of the testimony in the
fashion the court proposed does not undercut a prior verdict, it
fails to promote the traditional interests in the privacy of juror
deliberations and in protecting jurors from potential harassment-significant policies upon which the reluctance to permit
jurors to testify about their verdicts is also based. Moreover,
the court failed to explore fully the practical limits of its liberal
view of the impact of depositions on the jury system, and did
not address the distinction between allowing the use of affidavits or other voluntary juror testimony and the decision to subject an unwilling juror to the rigors of formal discovery.
Ensuring the stability of verdicts is unquestionably an important policy; this policy has prompted a number of jurisdictions to maintain broad exclusionary policies toward juror

testimony. The perceived lack of impact on verdict stability of
certain kinds of testimony has been of some importance in establishing the recognized exceptions to the juror exclusionary
principle. 43 Adoption by a number of American jurisdictions of
the so called "Iowa rule,"44 which allows receipt of testimony
on the compromise nature of a verdict, has, however, demonstrated that such exclusion is not crucial to the stability of ver43. In In re Nunns, 188 A.D. 424, 427-28, 176 N.Y.S. 858, 860-61 (1919), the
court allowed admission of juror affidavits in a criminal contempt prosecution
based on false answers to questions asked during voir dire. The court, citing
Vaise v. Delaval as the "pioneer case," stated that "[e]xamination of all the
cases cited... where the rule of exclusion has been applied will show procedure of attack upon the verdict and that the witnesses or affiants were excluded, not because they were or had been jurors, but because they could not
be heard to impeach their verdict." Id. at 427-28, 176 N.Y.S. at 860-61. See also
People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 186 N.E. 693, (1933). Recent cases create exceptions to the exclusionary principle by balancing the public policy considerations against the need of the litigant for admission. See People v. De Lucia, 20
N.Y.2d 275, 278, 229 N.E.2d 211, 213, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (1967). See generally
notes 41-42 supra.
44. The "Iowa rule" allows admission of evidence on objectively observable acts, statements, or occurrences that took place in the jury room, while still
excluding evidence on the jurors' thoughts or mental processes. As such, evidence on the act of arriving at a verdict by compromise or quotient methods is
admissible. See, e.g., Fales v. Kaupp, 83 S.D. 487, 490-91, 161 N.W.2d 855, 857
(1968) (by statute); Hukle v. Kinble, 172 Kan. 630, 637-39, 243 P.2d 225, 230-31
(1952). The phrase "Iowa rule" was first used by Wigmore, and is derived from
an early Iowa case, Wright v. Illinois and Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866). 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2353-2354 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1971).
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dicts. 45 Rather, it appears that most jurisdictions that have
retained a broad exclusionary policy are more concerned with
the possibility expressed in McDonald that "jurors would be
harassed and beset by the defeated party"4 6 if such evidence
were admitted.47 Although the New York law on juror affidavits
is an outgrowth of the common law rather than of a statutory
enactment,4 8 and therefore lacks explicit legislative history,
New York case law suggests that the policy reason for the rule
is, indeed, that the courts "do not wish to encourage post-trial
harassing of jurors for statements which might render their
49
verdicts questionable."
Concern with juror harassment can be examined by looking to the genesis of Federal Rule of Evidence 606,50 which em45. The House Judiciary Committee on Proposed Rule 606(b) lists twelve
states-California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington-that have adopted an "Iowa
rule." Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (Supp. 1972).
46. 238 U.S. at 267; see notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
47. See generally Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1976); Santilli v.
Pueblo, 184 Colo. 432, 521 P.2d 170 (1974); Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 229
S.E.2d 465 (1976).
48. There is some confusion in New York case law on whether juror affidavits are prohibited by statute. The New York Civil Rights Law provides:
A juror shall not be questioned, and is not subject to an action, or other
liability civil or criminal, for a verdict rendered by him, in an action in
a court of record, or not of record, or in a special proceeding before an
officer, except by indictment, for corrupt conduct, in a case prescribed
by law.
N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 14 (McKinney 1976). Section 14 has been cited as authority for the proposition that seeking affidavits from jurors in New York is
viewed with "disapproval." People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259, 272, 342 N.Y.S.2d 543,
556 (1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 35 N.Y.2d 22, 315 N.E.2d 762, 358
N.Y.S.2d 701 (1974). The statute is, however, only a restatement of the common
law rule, first set forth in Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670) (opinion of
Vaugh, C.J.), that jurors may not be prosecuted for their verdicts. See In re
Cochran, 237 N.Y. 336, 339-41, 143 N.E. 212, 213 (1924). See also Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 17 (1933). The statute is therefore neither the source of the
New York rule excluding juror affidavits nor a blanket prohibition on their use.
49. People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 278, 229 N.E.2d 211, 213, 278 N.Y.S.2d
526, 529 (1967).
50. Although an examination of Rule 606(b) provides an indication of the
motivations of contemporary policy-makers, the rule itself is not applicable to
Katz: in a diversity action, state rules on witness competence are applied
under Rule 601. See note 8 supra. Even if Rule 606(b) had applied in Katz, an
exception to the rule against juror testimony might justifiably have been found
by means of the same process of reasoning that supports an exception in New
York law. First, the federal rule is functionally identical to the New York common law position. See note 51 infra. Second, under both federal common law
and New York common law a need for balancing on the question of exceptions
to the general prohibition against juror testimony has been recognized. See
note 42 supra.
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bodies a principle functionally identical to the New York law
on juror testimony.5 ' The legislative history of Rule 606 provides insight into the motivations of contemporary policy makers in retaining the restrictive rule against the use of such
evidence. As originally drafted by the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee, the proposed rule followed the "Iowa rule," and
only excluded juror testimony "concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions ... or
concerning his mental processes." The original rule thus allowed admission of testimony as to objectively observable conduct;5 2 such a liberal rule was opposed by both the Justice
Department and the Chairperson of the Judiciary Committee,
primarily out of fear that it would result in an unacceptable
level of juror harassment.5 3 Such opposition resulted in the
adoption of the current, restrictive rule prohibiting jurors from
testifying "as to any matter of statement occurring during the
5 4
course of the jury's deliberations."
The number of jurisdictions that severely limit or totally

prohibit any post-trial contact between jurors and attorneys exemplifies the strength of the concern over potential juror harassment.55 In contrast, neither the federal nor the New York
system places significant limitations on post-trial contact. Such
51. In practice, both federal and New York law have the same general prohibition on juror testimony and similar exceptions. Compare FED. R. EviD.
606(b) and Mueller, supra note 15, at 945-56 with People v. De Lucia, 535 N.Y.2d
275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
52. See Mueller, supra note 15, at 927.
53. Id. In expressing his opposition to the draft proposal, the Attorney
General observed:
Strong policy considerations continue to support the rule that jurors
should not be permitted to testify about what occurred during the
course of their deliberations. Recent experience has shown that the
danger of harassment of jurors by unsuccessful litigants warrants a
rule which imposes strict limitations on the instances in which jurors
may be questioned about their verdict.
117 CONG. REc. 33648, 33654-55 (1971) (letter from Deputy Attorney General
Kliendienst to Judge Maris).
54. FED. R. Evm. 606(b). There is, however, an exception for extraneous
prejudicial information brought to the jury's attention or outside influence
brought to bear on a juror. See id.
55. Perhaps the most significant decision on this issue is Northern Pac. Ry.
v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1954), holding "that it is improper and unethical
for lawyers, court attaches or judges in a particular case to make public the
transactions in the jury room or to interview jurors to discover what was the
course of deliberation of a trial jury." Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted). See also
United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816, 819 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975); Smith v. Cupp, 457
F.2d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1972); Primm v. Continental Cas. Co., 143 F. Supp. 123,
127 (W.D. La. 1956); Elisovsky v. State, 592 P.2d 1221, 1228-29 (Alaska 1979);
Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 328, 104 N.W.2d 301,
303 (1960). See generally Mueller, supra note 15, at 961.
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contact can provide valuable information,5 6 and limits on the
admissibility of juror testimony are thought to provide a sufficient safeguard against harassment. The Katz decision, however, eliminates the safeguard against juror harassment in
situations involving offensive use of collateral estoppel, and
57
fails to impose an alternative means of protecting jurors. Indeed, the circumstances of Katz highlight the need for the protection of jurors. Although the Katz opinion passes lightly over
the wishes of Bichler jurors not to become involved, the trial
court in the Bichler case was sufficiently concerned about the
nature of the contact between Illy's counsel and the jurors to
prohibit all contact pending the Katz court's determination of
the issue.5 8 As characterized by the state court in Bichler, one
juror indicated "that she felt that she was being harassed by
the attorneys" by numerous phone calls "to her home and...
place of business," "[that] she felt much put upon," and "that
she felt that she [had] performed a public service by serving as
a juror, and ... that this harassment ... was an imposition." 59
The Katz court's decision to authorize the deposing of the
unwilling juror raises additional problems concerning the protection of jurors. Deposing an unwilling juror places the juror
before two adverse parties in a hostile environment. Moreover,
a decision to deny the prior judgment collateral estoppel effect
on the basis of such a deposition is unlikely to put an end to
the juror's quandary. Because constitutional due process limi6
tations prohibit the application of this decision to a nonparty,
a determination that the verdict in Bichler was flawed for collateral estoppel purposes would not bind third-party plaintiffs.
56. See Palmer, Post Trial Interview of Jurors in the Federal Courts-A
Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 Hous. L. REv.290 (1968). In addition to providing "feedback" on the effect of trial tactics on the jury, such interviews may shed light
upon those forms of misconduct about which jurors are competent to testify.
57. The ethical guidelines of the legal profession provide minimal restrictions on attorney-juror contact subsequent to trial ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7-108(D), (E) prohibit a lawyer from asking questions of a
former juror that are "calculated merely to harass or embarass" or conducting
"a vexatious or harasssing investigation."
58. 84 FR.D. at 380; see note 4 supra.
59. Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel § 4, Katz v. Eli Lilly, 84 F.R.D. 378
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting from the transcript of a conference held between both
sides of the Katz litigation and Justice Fraiman, trial judge in the Bichler
case).
60. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979); BlonderTongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of
Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). But see Note, CollateralEstoppel of Non-Parties, 87 HARv.L. REv.1485 (1974) (discussing possible exceptions to the rule).

1981]

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Multiple suits could therefore produce multiple opportunities
to urge the Bichler judgment as conclusive. Subsequent defendants could well be expected to seek the opportunity for an
independent examination of the jury's conduct by way of formal discovery, thus subjecting the juror to repeated subpoenas
and depositions.
Even though there are justifications for the admission of
some form of juror testimony in cases involving the offensive
use of collateral estoppel, the Katz court went too far in allowing the full weight of the judicial discovery machinery, including depositions and subpoenas, to be brought to bear on
uncooperative jurors. If the desire to protect jurors from harassment and jury room deliberations from restraints is to be
given substance, the specter of jurors being placed in adversary
deposition proceedings is unacceptable.
It would be equally undesirable for courts to admit juror affidavits that have been gained through voluntary out-of-court
contacts between attorneys and jurors, absent judicial safeguards. Jurors would suffer significant post-trial harassment if
parties knew that post-trial juror affidavits on compromise
could be admitted to prevent a judgment from being used for
offensive collateral estoppel purposes. Moreover, the policies
against juror harassment should not be viewed as grounded
merely in solicitude for the jurors themselves. The pressures
involved in post-trial interviews of jurors by attorneys would
quite probably reduce the reliability of the evidence so gathered, particularly if the testimony were concerned with a con61
cept as ambiguous as that of the "compromise verdict."
The line between legitimate compromise and jury misconduct is a fine one: in any case in which the jurors do not agree
on the first ballot, it may be possible to say that the verdict was
62
reached through a process of negotiation and compromise.
Merely because a jury obtained its damage award by totalling
the amount thought proper by each juror and dividing by
61. Because the jurors refused to cooperate with Lilly, the Katz court did
not have to consider the admissibility of affidavits.
62. As the New York Court of Appeals observed in People v. De Lucia, 20
N.Y.2d 275, 278, 229 N.E.2d 211, 213, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (1967),
[w]ith regard to jury room deliberations, scarcely any verdict might remain unassailable, if such statements were admissible. Common experience indicates that at times articulate jurors may intimidate the
inarticulate, the aggressive may unduly influence the docile. Some jurors may throw in' when deliberations have reached an impasse.
Others may attempt to compromise. Permitting jurors to testify re-

garding such occurrences would create chaos.
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twelve does not mean that the verdict was reached by an im-

permissible compromise.6 3 Such conduct may not even constitute an impermissible quotient verdict6 4 if the action was taken
without a prior agreement to abide by the results. 65 Finally,
even if it is assumed that the verdict damage award was improperly arrived at, there would seem to be no injustice in allowing the judgment estoppel effect if the verdict on liability
was properly decided.
The ambiguity of the concept of "compromise," combined

a juror that he or she
with the natural feeling on the part of
66
"owes something" to a defeated party,

makes it probable that

a skilled lawyer could lead a juror to characterize the give and
take of the jury room in the manner most helpful to the law-

yer's client.67 Thus, admitting either the depositions of unwilling jurors or the affidavits of willing jurors presents serious
difficulties in terms of juror harassment.
Poised against the potential for harassment of jurors inherent in any mechanism for eliciting juror testimony is the socie63. See Klein v. Eichen, 63 Misc. 2d 590, 592, 310 N.Y.S.2d 611, 615 (1970).
See also Boquist v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 516 S.W.2d 769, 777-78 (Mo. App.
1974); State Highway Comm. v. Matthis, 2 N.C. App. 233, 249-52, 163 S.E.2d 35, 4647 (1968).
64. In this context it is important to distinguish between the compromise
verdict and the quotient verdict. In a compromise verdict one or more of the
jurors do not believe in the accuracy of the verdict rendered, but surrender
their convictions in return for concession on another point, such as a reduced
damage award, by the other jurors. By contrast, a quotient verdict involves the
determination of damages after all members of the jury agree as to liability.
Typically, the jurors agree in advance to total the damage award thought
proper by each juror and divide that sum by twelve to arrive at the amount of
the verdict. The "add up and divide by twelve" process alleged to have been
used in Katz is therefore subject to some ambiguity of classification. If done to
reduce the damages awarded in the absence of a belief as to liability-as when
one or more jurors enter a zero sum into the calculation-the process is best
viewed as compromise. If, however, all agree as to liability and disagree as to
amount only, the result is a quotient verdict. As a quotient verdict goes only to
the issue of damages, it has no relevance to collateral estoppel on the issue of
liability.
65. See Honigsberg v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 43 Misc. 2d 1, 5-6, 249
N.Y.S.2d 296, 302-03 (1964). See also Birmingham S.R.R. v. McDonald, 339 So.2d
1004, 1007 (Ala. 1976); Bailey v. Fredericksburg Produce Ass'n, 229 Iowa 677, 68688, 295 N.W. 122, 126-27 (1940); cases cited in note 63 supra.
66. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1954) ("[A]ll
trial lawyers know that jurors, after the event, are always ready to be on the
side of whoever asks them."); Patterson v. Rossignol, 245 A.2d 852, 857-58 (Me.
1968) ("[The juror's] ill-considered statements were not volunteered but were
made to defeated counsel upon his abusive invasion of her privileged status as
a juror and undoubtedly given under the mistaken idea that she owed him a
duty of explanation. Such conduct by counsel is a serious impediment to the
").
administration of justice ....
67. See Mueller, supra note 15, at 924.
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tal interest in the appropriate application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. As one of the few jurisdictions expressly
holding that "indications of a compromise verdict" are relevant
in ruling on the effect of a prior judgment, New York has
demonstrated a welcome tendency to prohibit litigants from
carrying the use of offensive collateral estoppel beyond its equitable limits. 6 8 The problem facing the Katz court, then, was
one of balancing the need of a party for admission of juror testimony against the need to protect the juror and the jury system. That the court failed to examine thoroughly the
competing doctrines and policies and thereby unduly minimized the policies against juror testimony is not to say, however, that the evidence sought by Lilly should have been
excluded or that future litigants should be barred from making
such inquiries. The Katz court erred, not in sanctioning the receipt of evidence obtained through deposing or taking affidavits
from a juror, but in permitting litigants to gather this evidence
in the absence of adequate supervision by the court. The need
is for control over abuse, not prohibition of useful testimony.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, any mechanism
designed for exploration of the possibility of jury compromise
should provide a number of safeguards: (1) to ensure that jurors are not influenced by their contact with party litigants,
only evidence gathered under court supervision should be considered competent; (2) juror contact should be limited to a reasonable duration proximate to the conclusion of the trial; (3)
the system should be designed to avoid allowing the practice to
become a standard action at the conclusion of every trial; and
(4) state and federal policies prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict should not be undermined.
Numerous procedures could be designed to meet these criteria. A number of potential solutions are suggested by court
rules designed to govern juror interviews. Minnesota, for example, requires that a litigant present the court with extrinsic
evidence of misconduct as a69precondition to a hearing and examination before the court. Juror interviews are not prohib68. See notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text.
69. [R]ather than permit or encourage the promiscuous interrogation
of jurors by the defeated litigant, we think that the better practice
would be to bring the matter to the attention of the trial court, and, if it

appears that the facts justify so doing, the trial court may then summon the juror before him and permit an examination in the presence of
counsel for all interested parties and the trial judge under proper safeguards.
Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 328, 104 N.W.2d 301,
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ited, but evidence gathered outside the established procedures
will not be admitted. Similarly, Wyoming limits interviews
with jurors to situations in which written interrogatories accompanied by an affidavit setting forth reasons for the pro70
posed interrogatories are filed with the court.
Perhaps the most promising procedural solution is to ex-

pand the process of polling the jury upon the motion of a party
litigant at the conclusion of the trial. Polling in open court after
a verdict has been announced is a common practice designed to
ensure that each juror approves of the verdict;7 1 polling on the
manner in which the verdict was reached is now generally prohibited on the theory that it represents an attempt to circumvent the prohibition against using juror testimony to impeach
the verdict.7 2 If, however, a litigant were willing to waive any
objections to the verdict in the instant litigation and could
demonstrate the possibility of future litigation, examination by
the trial judge on the issue of jury misconduct would provide a
means of determining if the verdict was reached by compromise. Such an examination, presumably prefaced with an explanation that nothing said would affect the successful party,
could inquire into the existence of any of the common patterns
used to arrive at a compromise verdict. If evidence of compromise were found, the examination could explore such critical
questions as whether the jurors made an antecedent agreement
to be bound.7 3 Because the examination would be conducted at
303 (1960). Imposition of such a rule would, of course, have frustrated Lilly's
desires in Katz, as it appears that the prior Bichler verdict presented no extrinsic evidence of misconduct.
70. Wyo. DisT. CT. R. 18(b). Although codification of such a rule is uncommon, a number of jurisdictions prohibit juror contact generally, with provision
that exception will be granted upon a showing of need. See generally note 41
supra and cases cited therein.
71. See 5A J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 49.07 (2d ed. 1980). The purpose
of such polling is to assure that the jury process was free from coercion, last
minute doubt, or lack of required uniformity. See Lovell v. McCullough, 439
S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tenn. 1969); Wilkerson v. Darragh & Lyda, Inc., 408 S.W.2d 542,
543-44 (Tex. App. 1966).
72. See Hoffman v. City of St. Paul, 187 Minn. 320, 325-27, 245 N.W. 373, 37576 (1932); Miller v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co., 123 W.Va. 428, 437-38, 15 S.E.2d 400,
405 (1941); cf. Patillo v. Thomas, 128 S.E.2d 656, 662 (Ga. 1962) (no error in refusing to poll on nature of jury's deliberations); Barton v. Jensen, 429 P.2d 44, 46
(Utah 1967) (inquiry into inconsistencies in special verdict is an abuse of discretion). But see Kirland v. Robbins, 385 S.2d 694, 695-96 (Fla. App. 1980) (dicta
suggesting that a trial judge may poll as to the existence of quotient verdict if
indications of such exist).
73. The form of these questions could be. determined solely by the judge,
or litigants could be asked to submit proposals, as is often the case with jury
instructions.
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the conclusion of the trial, there would be little inconvenience
to the jurors and no time for them to develop second thoughts
as to the nature of the verdict. Finally, the requirement that
the losing litigant agree to accept the verdict in the instant case
and demonstrate the possibility of future litigation would prevent the practice from becoming a mechanism for impeaching
verdicts, and would ensure that the practice would not become
standard in cases in which offensive collateral estoppel is only
a remote possibility.
Although Katz represents a welcome move toward allowing greater flexibility in the determination of collateral estoppel issues in offensive-use cases, the court's disregard of
policies seeking to protect jurors and their deliberations cannot
be easily justified. If such evidence is to be admissible, its acquisition should be subject to greater controls over the party
litigants than were provided for in Katz, and in no case should
the deposition of an unwilling juror be permitted. With adequate judicial safeguards the admission of such testimony can
promote fairness without threatening the policies underlying
the general exclusionary principle for juror testimony.

